Divided and with little mobilization power, the strike called by opposition in Tarija did not create much of a stir. A total suspension of activity was expected in the department that holds the largest natural gas reserves in Bolivia.

However, the decision by Evo Morales’ government to take civic leaders, involved in attempts against the gas line in September’s conflicts, into preventive custody has the potential to reorganize and reunite regional opposition.

The opinion of local political analysts is that the use of force indicates a lack of authority. Through this, the more radical department representatives, who have rejected agreements signed with the government, have an opportunity to gain new supporters.

The Executive power has made yet another mistake. Each time that force is put in use, it creates signs of debility. In addition to mobilizing opposition, it creates space for the emergence of new political players.

As a consequence, the opinion is that in 2009 the government will not have a simple outlook ahead, as it will be facing a unified opposition. In addition, President Evo Marales’ adversaries know that a joint effort in the constitutional referendum in January will be easier than in the general elections in December, when all of the players will choose to be candidates, causing difficulty in the construction of collective objectives.

For all these reasons, the referendum campaign tends to be very intense. Even with the power of the machine and the support of social movement on behalf of the government, the scenario is indefinite. Research shows that around 20% of voters are undecided. Therefore, the current trend is that the victory of “Yes” or “No” to the new Constitution project will be by a marginal difference. 

After being listed as running for a seat in congress in the 2009 legislative election in order to strengthen government alliance, speculation arose in Argentina that former president Néstor Kirchner may be a candidate for a seat as Senator of the province of Buenos Aires.

Recent occurrences in Argentine politics indicate that Néstor really should be a candidate in order to contain the trend of Kirchnerism losing ground. As the Casa Rosada (Argentine Presidential Palace) has lost control of the agenda since the conflict with ruralists, the name of the former president appears increasingly stronger in betting books.

However, for Néstor Kirchner to become a candidate, a large scale political articulation would be necessary.  Eric Calcagno, the senator that took over as alternate in the place of President Cristina Kirchner, would have to resign. That way, a vacancy would open. The government’s nomination list has Néstor as a candidate for Senate and the Minister of Health, Graciela Ocaña, as alternate.

As Cristina is currently worn out, an alternative for presidential succession in 2011 would be Néstor Kirchner; in the event of him being elected Senator, he would have to resign in order to be a presidential candidate once again. The alternate Ocaña would take over his position. She would be able to leave the Ministry of Health in order to collaborate with the ruling government. 

After the November 23 regional elections reduced the chance for a new constitutional reform, Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez, is looking to Plan B, with his eye on the possibility of running for another term.

He requested the PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) to begin the necessary actions to amend the constitution that would allow him to run for unlimited reelection.  As constitutional reform is a slow process, the government strategy is to make the initiative viable by means of a constitutional amendment.

The argument being used by Chávez and his allies is that the future of the revolution is at stake. That is why the continuation of the current project is necessary. For this reason, the PSUV wants to make the changes possible through the National Assembly.

As Chávez has almost full support from the 167 members of the legislative power, it would be easier to win over the 30% of congress necessary to alter the constitution than to collect the signatures of 15% of the citizens registered in the electoral census, that is, 2,553,160 people.

The PSUV expects the discussion about the first amendment to take place in December, with the second to follow in January. The referendum will take place in February.

As the government has no alternative candidates to Hugo Chávez in facing the opposition, which showed a strong capacity for unity in the regional election, the PSUV will be relying on the constitutional change that would allow Chávez to run for another term.

If the government wins the referendum, the opposition will have a hard time constructing a name that carries the same political weight as that of the president.  They could only hope that the economic crisis makes the government impracticable. If, however, he is beaten, the possibility of losing the important quota of his constituency initiated in 2007 will become much clearer. 

The Mayor of Lima, Luis Castañeda Lossio, considered quite conservative, and the leader of the left wing and former presidential candidate, Ollanta Humala, were shown to be leading the most recent public opinion survey on the vote for succession in 2011, carried out by the company CPI.

According to the polls, Castañeda Lossio has 18% compared to Humalla’s 16.9%. The third position is held by former presidential candidate Lourdes Flores, with 13.4%, technically tied with right wing congresswoman Keiko Fujimori (13%), daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori. Former President Alejandro Toledo holds 10%, president of the Board of Ministers, Yehude Simon, 3.3% and congresswoman from the Aprista Peruano Party (APRA), Mercedes Cabanillas, has 3.2%.

Even though the elections are a long way off (three years), the similar percentages of Castañeda, Humalla, Keiko and Toledo suggests that the scenario will lead to a very close run off among the various competitive candidacies. With such similar numbers, the probability of the dispute ending in the 1st runoff has become greatly reduced. Therefore, the goal of the players will be to win at least 20% of the votes to ensure a place in the runoff. 

The victory of Democrat Barack Obama for the presidency of the US has given indications of a change in America’s foreign policies in relation to Latin America. During the eight years of George W. Bush’s administration, and especially after 9/11, the US focus has been on the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. Due to this, Latin America was largely sidelined.

A change is expected with Obama, as historically Democrats view Latin America with more “care” than Republicans. However, the interventionist character of the Democratic government creates obstacles for free trade deals with the region.

According to the president-elect, a new chapter will be written on the relationship with the southern hemisphere. In interviews given throughout his campaign, Obama’s assistants spoke of working together across the continent.

If on one hand he shows signs of possible dialogue with his Latin American counterparts, on the other, his protectionist character is still apparent. For the Democrats, it is necessary to maintain the market open and dynamic, as long as it does not benefit only the rich and large companies.

The differences are clear in relation to George W. Bush. There may be gains in the region in terms of dialogue. However, Obama may give in to the agenda of American trade unions, which are against free trade agreements.

Besides the damaging of partnerships with strategic allies (Colombia and Mexico, for example), Latin Americans will have a harder time entering the American market due to the “more restricted” character of the economy, as expected to be conducted by the Democrats.

The biggest mystery is getting to know what the relationship will be like between Barack Obama and the president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, who stated his preference for the Democrat during Obama’s campaign.  Different to Republicans, who have a confrontational stance in relation to the Venezuelan Head of State, Obama talks of sending a message of democratic values to Caracas, not through interventionism, but through means of cooperation.

Democrats believe that the mistakes made by the George W. Bush in the region gave ground to anti-democratic views expressed by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. 

The Democrats’ greater economic protectionism and Barack Obama’s dislike of FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) make the signing of this type of agreement with Uruguay improbable - a possibility raised in 2007 after the signing of a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).

In addition to this, the effects of the international financial crisis on the Uruguayan economy make the local market far less attractive to American companies, who are today more interested in protecting their businesses. 

Peru is one of the countries expected to undergo little change in its relationship with the US. As its FTA (Free Trade Agreement) has already been signed, it has the support of Barack Obama and the Democrats. However, the more interventionist policies of the new American government may cause a few trade barriers. 

The relationship between Mexico and the US is expected to undergo changes during the future Barack Obama administration, in much the same way as Colombia. Within the Democratic vision of the market needing to continue open and dynamic - but while still favoring the working class - , NAFTA (the free trade agreement the USA has with Mexico and Canada) is expected to be brought back to the discussion table.

Obama’s opinion is that the free trade agreements with North America defend the interests of companies only. Besides, he sees the Merida Initiative (an anti drug trafficking project similar to the Plan Colombia) as the first step in solving the problem of organized crime. 

With a regime in transition since Fidel Castro stepped down, Cuba will also feel the impact of new policies in the White House. In his speeches, president-elect Barack Obama talked of establishing a true policy in support of human freedom. One of his intentions is to send a message to Cubans about civil rights. However, for now, the island’s embargo will remain unchanged.

As contrary as it may seem, a policy of increased dialogue with Cuba will only damage Cuban president Raúl Castro. If this is to happen, the Castro regime will begin to lose their anti-American rhetoric as a way of maintaining unity among their allies. In this way, the transition can be accelerated.