Archive for the ‘Latin America’ Category
Wednesday, May 2nd, 2012
The House of Representatives approved on Thursday (26) the draft of a legislative decree authorizing the ratification of the agreement signed between Brazil and the United Nations (UN) to implement the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) , Rio 20, in Rio de Janeiro, during June 13th to the 22nd . The event takes place 20 years after Eco-92 or the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which also dealt with sustainable development.
The document signed between Brazil and the United Nations sets out the facilities where the conference will take place, as well as specifying the equipment, medical facilities, accommodation, transport, finance and liability issues, privileges, immunities and the safety of participants, among other points.
The Rio 20 will discuss, as a major theme, the green economy in the context of sustainability and poverty eradication, and the institutional framework for sustainable development.
Representatives of member states or in some cases non members may participate in the event, as well as members of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Bank (IBRD), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO), and accredited entities and non-governmental organizations.
According to the rapporteur of the agreement from the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives, congressman Bohn Gass (PT-RS), Rio 20 will be the opportunity to make an assessment of how everyone is dealing the strategies set during the first conference in 1992, and how they are being complied along with the international agreements made to enforce the commitments.
Saturday, December 26th, 2009
The year of 2010 will be a very agitated one in Latin America. In Uruguay, the ex Tupamaro guerrilla, José Mujica, will take office as the new president. He will be responsible maintaining the economical and social achievements inaugurated by the Frente Amplio (Broad Front), through current president Tabaré Vásquez, in 2005.
On the other hand, like every change of government, adjustments are expected. There is a silent debate on whether or not to maintain Uruguay’s participation in MERCOSUR. There are important ties amongst Mujica’s allies who defend a Uruguayan posture which is more similar to the Chilean posture: to participate, but to have the power to make commercial partnerships in their interest. With the arrival of Venezuela, there is a feeling that Uruguayan power, which was already minor, will decrease even further. Moreover, the probable politicization of MERCOSUR does not favor Uruguay.
I believe that 2010 will be one more balanced year in Uruguay. One of the greatest challenges Mujica will face will be to keep the young population inside the country, since the average age of Uruguayans is increasing. The tendency for young Uruguayans is to study in Argentina or in other countries, and this jeopardizes the country’s labor force. Mujica will have to invest so that young people in Uruguay feel they might have similar job opportunities in their own country.
In Chile, after 20 years in power, Concertación (Concertation) – the center-left coalition that has governed the country since 1990 – is at risk of being defeated by the center-right forces, grouped around Sebastian Piñera, of Alianza por Chile (Alliance for Chile). He will run in the 2nd round against ex-president Eduardo Frei, representative of Concertación, on January 17. Like Uruguay, Chile is on “auto-pilot”. Economical issues are not points of divergence, but rather convergence. With an intelligent campaign, Piñera avoided attacks against Eduardo Frei and preferred to characterize Concertación as the “continuation of the old Chilean policy.” Piñera branded himself as the candidate who will maintain the achievements of Concertación, and make improvements. To reach a larger public, Piñera gave up his conservative posture and now defends homosexual marriage and the distribution of the morning-after pill. This way, even with a popularity rate above 80%, Michelle Bachelet has not been able to pass this popularity on to Eduardo Frei.
In Brazil and Colombia, the political agenda will revolve around the elections. In Brazil, supported by the popularity of president Lula, PT will try to reach the third consecutive mandate with minister Dilma Rousseff. On the opposition, governor of São Paulo, José Serra (PSDB), will try to drive the tucanos (toucans, as PSDB members are known) to power once again. If nothing new happens, the Brazilian election is bound to be polarized between PT and PSDB, a fact that has repeated since 1994. The scoreboard is tied 2×2. Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) won in 1994 and 1998. PT had its payback in 2002 and 2006, by electing and re-electing Lula. The candidates’ decision for vice-president will be a big issue. On Dilma’s side, Michel Temer is losing ground daily while Henrique Meirelles is gaining strength. On Serra’s side, Senator Agripino Maia is a name well suited to the position, that’s why he is among those fighting hard to force Governor José Arruda from his party, the Democrats.
In Colombia, the pre-election setting is undefined. President Álvaro Uribe, even though he hasn’t announced it yet, intends to run for a third consecutive mandate. However, he needs the Supreme Court’s approval for a popular referendum. While this issue is not solved, the election chessboard will be incomplete. If Uribe enters as a candidate, he will be the favorite and should be reelected easily. If the president is prevented from running for the second consecutive reelection, “plan B” is ex-minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos. Still, Uribe would be able to elect Juan Manuel Santos. His impressive popularity and the population’s trust in his government, would lead a large part of the population to vote on a candidate chosen by Uribe. However, the real tendency is for Uribe to be the candidate.
In Argentina and Mexico, the focus will be on economic issues. In Argentina, it is estimated that inflation will close 2009 at a rate of 35%. To make things worse, “Kirchnerism” is losing political power.
In 2007, the year in which the president of Argentina, Cristina Kirchner, was elected, she had a popularity rate of 55%, and the support of 20 out of 24 governors. She could also count on the majority of the National Congress. In the Chamber of Deputies, 161 of 257 deputies were “Kirchneristas”. In the senate, 47 of 72 senators were part of its base.
Around two years later, the political capital of the Head of State has been seriously affected. In the Chamber of Deputies, “Kirchnerism” has 104 of 257 deputies in its base. In the Senate, 36 of 72 senators support the government. To make things worse, currently, only 10 of 24 governors support Cristina Kirchner.
With so many problems ahead, Casa Rosada can only hope for an economic recovery and that ex-president Néstor Kirchner returns to the command of the Partido Justicialista – PJ (Justicialist Party). Something that is very unlikely to happen.
In Mexico, the expectation for 2010 is that it will be better than 2009. Because of the ties of the country with the American economy, the Mexican Gross Internal Product (GDP) was heavily affected. Apart from crumbling the popularity of Felipe Calderón, the economical juncture catapulted the legendary Partido da Revolução Institucional – PRI (Institutional Revolution Party). With around three more years ahead, Calderón is betting on the recovery of economic activity to help neutralize his two main adversaries: PRI and PRD’s national leader Manuel López Obrador.
In the Bolivarian Block (Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia) we can expect a growth in the Anti-American speech. In Venezuela, Hugo Chavés will test his popularity and the popularity of the Partido Socialista Unido da Venezuela – PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) in the legislative elections. Different from four years ago, the opposition will not boycott the elections, a fact that should make the elections more competitive. However, the Venezuelan opposition suffers from something very similar to the Bolivian opposition: There is no articulation, there are many internal conflicts and disputes wearing down its strongest names. Thus, in case there is no restructuring in what the opposition is really aiming for, Chavés will see their implosion and will have a relatively calm campaign. On the economic field, the government is placing its bets on the increased value of a barrel of oil in the international market. If this does not happen, the difficulties will be tremendous, because more than 45% of 2010’s budget has been set aside for social spending. Apart from this, the reserve that Chávez stored when the price of the barrel was above US$ 100 is coming to an end. He strongly depends on a rise in the oil barrel price.
In Ecuador, president Rafael Correa’s challenge will be to maintain his popularity (around 58% according to the last surveys). As in Venezuela, the country is expected to face future economical troubles.
Inside the Bolivarian Block, attention has been turned to Bolivia. After the results of the last presidential election, the Movimiento al Socialismo (Socialist Movement) – the party of president Evo Morales – conquered hegemony in the political system. MAS (Socialist Movement Party) not only controls the Chamber of Deputies, but also has the absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, the sum of Morales popularity with the power conquered by MAS should strengthen the nationalist-indigenous project of the Bolivian Head of State. The tendency is that the so called “Bolivian Refoundation”, was barred by the Senate in many opportunities for advancing. Another factor that is helping Evo Morales is the lack of opposition articulation. We can expect a more radical government in Bolivia. This time, Morales will not have so many bureaucratic, political and judicial deadlocks preventing him from implementing changes in the new Constitution.
Domestic politics will develop in 2010 as they did in 2009 in all countries. Continental geopolitics may be confronted by different moves. The conclusion of military acquisitions by Brail (fighter planes, tanks, helicopters and submarines) will stimulate other countries to review their own military programs. Argentina, for example, is awaiting definitions regarding Brazil in order to initiate the process of their Armed Forces’ modernization. Rumor has it that the choice of fighter planes Brazil makes will directly affect the choice the Argentinean Air Force makes. Ecuador is another country expected to modernize its Armed Forces. This does not mean we are living in a worrying moment, but even more worrying are South American countries with scrapped armed forces, which is the current situation. MERCOSUR will enter a new phase in 2010. With the entrance of Venezuela, political themes will naturally be part of the block’s agenda. This may jeopardize the survival of MERCOSUR, as there is already a founding member (Uruguay), whose society is discussing whether participation is worthwhile or not.
Friday, November 27th, 2009
By Thiago de Aragão (*)
Brazil, along with France, intends to leverage strong engagement from industrialized and developing countries in order to define bold agreements for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. Both countries want an 80% reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases compared to levels in 1990. They have also agreed to a reduction of at least 50% by 2050.
Brazil’s main objective is to show its commitment to sustainable development and its level of concern about the emission of greenhouse gases. The actions proposed by Brazil are expected to promote a 36.1 to 38.9% reduction on the emissions the country would achieve by 2020 if nothing was done. Of this total, 20% will result from an 80% drop in deforestation of the Amazon. According to estimates by the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), Amazon deforestation levels in 2009 will be the lowest in the last 21 years, with a 40% reduction in comparison to last year’s numbers.
Furthermore, an agricultural/ecological zoning system was developed in order to supervise the expansion of sugar-cane crops for the production of Ethanol fuel. The system allowed an increase in the crop’s plantation area, while prohibiting expansion in protected areas like the Amazon and Pantanal.
The Brazilian strategy is becoming quite embarrassing for developed countries that are not environmentally active, forcing them to accept bolder goals for the Copenhagen Protocol. More than that, encouraging them to invest more financial resources to fight climate change in developing countries. The perception behind this change of focus is that Brazil can benefit a great deal from transitioning to a low carbon economy: after all, the country has one of the cleanest energy matrixes in the world, is a world-leader in biofuels and most of its emissions (illegal deforestation) is not linked to economic growth.
Brazil is also in favor of approving regulations that enable and popularize technologies that are still protected by patents, generally owned by wealthy countries. In order to foster technology transfers, the Brazilian government has already proposed the establishment of a multilateral public fund to invest in purchasing licenses for manufacturing products and using patent protected processes and equipment. The Brazilian committee will also argue that the intellectual property regime cannot have the sole objective of protecting the copyrights of inventors.
In Brazil’s view, developing countries should fully explore their national capacities for investments in the climate agenda. However, the country also states that there is a need for an increase in financing and technology transfers. The claim suggests that if these initiatives do not come from developed nations, it will become increasingly harder to face climate change while increasing economic and social development. The contribution from developed countries is not seen as a donation, but as an international obligation.
Changing its posture towards a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, Brazil wants to be the leading name behind an international pact to fight climate change. Even though Brazil’s International Relations seem to be in good shape, the Lula administration still needs the so-called international “big break”. Since 2003, the Brazilian President has been trying a series of diplomatic maneuvers that have not been as successful as expected. In spite of the successful 2016 Olympic bid for Rio de Janeiro, one cannot forget the Honduras episode, in which Deposed Honduran President Manuel Zelaya took shelter in the Brazilian Embassy, inciting much controversy in international public opinion.
The Brazilian Government’s stand at the 15th United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change also has a lot to do with the 2011 presidential elections. Senator Marina Silva, known for her political influence on environmental issues, has left the Labor Party to run for President.
Losing her represented a significant imbalance for the party and the President, as her candidacy makes it harder for the Government to use comparisons between President Lula and ex-president Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Government as an advantage for reelecting the party.
The presidential elections – though not admitted – influenced Brazil’s current stand in Copenhagen, because if the country’s campaign is successful, it would represent a powerful argument for President Lula’s candidate Dilma Rousseff in her battle against Marina Silva when it comes to environmental issues.
Monday, September 28th, 2009
Predictably enough, the current situation in Honduras has been the main source of news in Latin America last week. Manuel Zelaya’s return has yet to be explained in full, clear detail, with Brazil taking an active role in the entire affair.
Regardless of how Manuel Zelaya entered the country, what remains is that he made it happen before the UN’s General Assembly, based on his own schedule. After the coup led by Roberto Micheletti set in, the whole subject seemed to wane week after week, with Zelaya roaming across countries in search of what to do next.
After 86 days, his not so triumphant return (in contrast to the first attempt weeks earlier) took place with Brazil assuming an active role in the entire situation, a role Brazil has longed for in many years as the doorway into the region’s diplomatic spotlight. One cannot doubt, still a hard thing to believe, that Brazil – one of the region’s leading nations – did not know of Zelaya’s return until he pressed the buzzer of the Brazilian embassy in Tegucicalpa. I believe, for sake of our diplomacy, that Brazil had already been informed of the affair before it happened.
It is not difficult to acknowledge Brazil’s refuge of the overthrown president as appropriate and legitimate. Since the Brazilian government recognizes Zelaya as Honduras’ legitimate president, how could the embassy staff tell him to turn around and seek refuge elsewhere? The Brazilian government’s decision in this respect was correct and fortunate. On the other hand, the nation has made a serious mistake that can jeopardize its pursuit of a more active, leading role as global mediator in that it allowed and authorized Zelaya to take hold of a microphone and stir the country’s population right from the embassy’s balcony in Tegucicalpa. At that very minute Brazil switched its stance, ceasing to be a mediator and taking an active, collaborative role in the entire affair. If you take sides with a man who happens to be the enemy of the de facto government (whether or not a legitimate one), it is no surprise if some retaliation will ensue afterwards (such as the cutting off of water, power and phone services).
Over the years Brazil has seen its importance grow as a regional leader. Some facts are still under considerable shade when contrasted to the country’s power and diplomatic tradition. Argentine journalists have said that Honduras could well be president Lula’s “Waterloo” in the realm of foreign policy. The Colombian media kept asking the one and only question: how come Brazil was not aware of Zelaya’s return?
The emerging picture suggests that it has been a well concocted plan by Hugo Chávez, since the plane that took Zelaya to the border was of Venezuelan nationality and it is the Venezuelan leader, not Lula, with whom Zelaya maintains an almost daily telephone exchange. However, just when the controversy reached its apex, here comes Zelaya knocking at the front door of the Brazilian embassy. Although conceived by a third nation, Venezuela, this situation may well bring some gain and yet a lot of trouble for the image of Brazilian diplomacy.
The Brazilian government is trying to convince Zelaya to take asylum in Brazil. In doing this, tension around the Brazilian embassy might subside and negotiation might emerge as the only way out. Despite talks over the use of violence, this does not seem a feasible alternative at the moment. A significant disruption in the ranks of the country’s military would have to occur for a civil war to ensue. In Honduras, however, the Armed Forces and also the Legislative and Judiciary branches rallied alongside Roberto Michelletti, as well as a significant portion of the country’s population. Zelaya, on the other hand, has insufficient supporters within the military to hope for such rupture. Moreover, supporters of Zelaya are but a minority group within the country’s population.
Micheletti is expected to strain and overcome Zelaya and Brazil with exhaustion. Brazil should try to convince Zelaya to take political asylum. It is unlikely that a different scenario may take place as the situation develops.
Tuesday, September 22nd, 2009
Brazilian foreign policy adopted yesterday a bold stance in accepting in the Brazilian Embassy in Honduras, the ousted president of that country, Manuel Zelaya, overthrown in a coup on June 28, promoted by the Supreme Court and the Hondurean Parliament. Although this posture was criticised by many political analysts, it is an important movement of the Lula government to try to recover the lost role in Latin America.
Since 2003, the year of the first term of President Lula, Brazil loses ground for two reasons:
1) Lula’s first term in Brazil was very complicated in domestic politics, due to successive corruption scandals involving members of his administration.
2) The dubious attitude of the Brazilian government to seek consensus in a region marked by political radicalization since the arrival of Hugo Chávez to power in Venezuela.
The sum of these two events boosted the traditional left-led by Chavez, finding followers in Bolivia (Evo Morales) and Ecuador (Rafael Correa).
Willing to change this scenario, Brazil took advantage of the favorable international situation to help Zelaya and adopt a position of major role in Latin American politics.
This movement could go either way. Brazilian diplomacy could provoke a dialogue between Manuel Zelaya and Roberto Micheletti. In this case, it would be a victory of the Brazilian diplomacy and a consolidated role of regional mediator. In a more negative scenario, the Brazilian diplomacy could host violent maneuvers provoked by Zelaya’s sympathisers, leading to further division and breakdown in the country. In this case, Brazil would suffer a major setback.
It is not a bad decision to allow Zelaya to be protected at the Brazilian embassy. Nevertheless, it is a very wrong movement to allow him to instigate the population from within the building of the Brazilian representation. In this case, if a violent clash starts due to Zelaya’s words from the balcony of the Brazilian embassy, the international community will consider Brazil less as a mediator in this episode and more as a collaborator of Zelaya.
Friday, September 18th, 2009
The week in Latin America was pretty busy due to the repercussions on President Lula’s comment during a visit by the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy. Besides being the honor guest and besides the fact that it is the year of France in Brazil, Sarkozy came with two missions: the first one was simple and the second was relatively difficult. The simple mission was to carry out something that was already or partially agreed upon: the purchase of submarines and helicopters. The difficult mission would be to turn things around regarding the fighters Brazil intends to buy.
Still missing a technical report, Rafale (French fighter aircrafts) was not FAB’s (Brazilian Air Force) favorite. The engineers apparently prefer the Swedish plane Gripen NG, while pilots show a preference for the Super Hornet F-18, from the USA. Informally, Lula made Sarkozy’s job easier when argued that Rafale fighters could be chosen because this agreement would also include “transferring technology”. In the FX-2 program, technology transfer is a qualifying condition since the beginning of the bidding process. Each of the three current competitors presented solid technology transfer proposals.
Regardless of the merit of finding the best or worst choice for Brazil, Lula created a serious problem. Competition has become a relatively simple target for lawyers who would like to legally paralyze FX-2. The deal is only expected to be closed in October, but Lula ignored FAB’s opinion and created a diplomatic situation with the USA and Sweden. In Latin America, repercussion was immediate. The Colombian press, for instance, wants to find out whether there will be a dispute for influence among the USA, France and Russia in South America. According to Colombians, the rationale will take place through the full support of the USA concerning the Colombian cause against FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Force of Colombia), the relationship between Chávez and Russia and now the possibility Brazil has to buy everything at once.
Sovereignty, a word repeated time and again by the Brazilian Government, is in a dubious situation: depending on only one country for strategic weapons, as well as their parts and know-how. This same sovereignty was the theme on each Argentinean trendsetters decided to argue about. Will Brazil really take a dominant global position, or does the country want to speed up this process by getting stuck to a aligned country? For Argentineans, the purchase of Brazilian weapons is extremely important. In some occasions, they make it clear that, as far as the fighters are concerned, Argentina could follow Brazil’s choice. However, considering Rafale’s astronomic value, which even reduced will continue high if compared to the other two competitors, Argentina will not afford a complete squad. As part of the seduction package offered by Sarkozy, Brazil will be the exclusive vendor of Rafales in Latin America. Nevertheless, which neighbor country can pay for such plane?
In Mexico, they set a tone of irony. Formally the purchase of Brazilian weapons was little discussed, but according to talks with Mexican government sources, they believe Brazil is about to close a complicated deal with France in case it really buys the Rafale fighters. It is even considered that this plane could not be sold outside France. There were 14 lost biding processes and a great deal of confusion. There is no doubt that this is an excellent fighter, but which runs the risk of having Brazil and Libya as its sole purchasers.
Friday, August 7th, 2009
Latin America is once again the stage of political disturbances after some months of relative stillness. The situation in Honduras, which has brought the idea of military coup d’état back to the continent, is yet to be clearly defined. Roberto Micheletti non-recognized government has been really tough regarding sanctions threats it has received.
Since Manuel Zelaya, the overthrown President of Honduras, was arrested and extradited, we could identify how important players in the continent started to find their position. Hugo Chávez, from Venezuela, was the first to stand up for the use of force so that his ally, Zelaya, could rule again. Much more used to rhetoric than to practice, Chávez gave a deadline to Micheletti accept Zelaya’s return, or he would have to “face the consequences of the use of force”. As we could expect from Chávez, the deadline came and nothing happened. The USA’s government attitude – and particularly Obama’s – was a nightmare for Chávez. Obama agrees that Zelaya should come back and that Micheletti must leave the government immediately, i.e., the antagonism Chávez has been growing for years with the USA government did not take place in this specific and highly important fact. As the Venezuelan ruler’s speech feeds from the confrontation with the USA, a situation in which both are in the same side is no good for the maintenance of the Bolivarian speech.
Meanwhile, the situation in Honduras drags on. The overthrown President does not have the popular support he would like to enjoy; thus, there is no public pressure for his return. At the same time, the new government does not seem to care about any kind of sanction. As there are no leaders inconsequent enough to engage in an armed conflict against Honduras, the situation is totally in the hands of the coupists. The most likely scenario for this situation would be Zelaya’s return with the promise of anticipated elections. Thus, it is more likely that a third political force, non-linked to Zelaya or Micheletti, arises with sufficient strength to win.
Because of what happened in Honduras, conspiracy theories blossom. Strong rumors indicate that military coup d’états won’t stop after the isolated fact that took place in Honduras. Some people believe and some would bet that Paraguay would be the next. As Venezuela was partially immobilized in this case, thanks to the North-American attitude of sharing the same opinion regarding the military overthrow, people’s attention turned to a curious fact in the continent. The recent announcement that the USA would build three military bases in Colombia was everything Chávez needed. He got lucky because this fact took place at the same time in which Venezuelan weapons made in Sweden were found with the FARC, obviously weapons donated to terrorists. American bases, a more relevant issue, veiled the confirmation of another tie between the Venezuelan government and the FARC.
As usual, Chávez took his ambassador out of Bogotá and immediately denounced a plan of an American invasion against his country. Colombia, just like the USA, preferred to remain silent. However, the South American community in general was upset. Lula demonstrated his concern over the continent militarization process, while Chile’s President, Michelle Bachelet, said the same.
Behind the scenes, the Venezuelan response will be stronger that simply using the old rhetoric and taking their ambassador out of their neighbor country. The Russian government was offered the opportunity of placing military bases in Venezuela. In the talks between the two countries, however, Russia made it clear they have no interest whatsoever in having military bases in South America. There are more strategic points in Asia for Russia to build bases. Yet, the Venezuelan counterproposal was really interesting for the Russians: the building of a Russian military base for the manufacturing of weapons where the main buyer would be the very Venezuelan government. With the ongoing negotiations involving, above all, business, we can foresee another series of controversies between Venezuela and Colombia. If there is a clear concern regarding the American bases that are to be built in Colombia, the Venezuelan response shows that it is not interesting to solve the case, but disturb the “opponent” more and more.
The Brazilian response, via Palácio do Itamaraty, was to reject the militarization in the continent. There couldn’t be another response from a country that, given its size, is the leader in the continent. This “arms race” certainly turns our continent into a more interesting place, but the huge quantity of irresponsible leaders turns it into a more dangerous place as well. But the uncertainty of Brazil regarding the building of bases or the purchase of weapons can be considered a little hypocritical. In the middle of the purchase of nuclear submarines, combat helicopters and fourth generation fighter planes, Brazil is arousing the need to buy weapons also in Argentina, Peru and Equator.
On the other hand, Brasil must strengthen their Armed Forces in order to comply with another global power requirement. The curious fact is that, in the case of Brazil, the sovereignty expected from technology transfers, which encompass contracts under negotiation to buy helicopters, submarines and aircrafts, can end up in the hands of a sole supplier, France. Sovereignty would be masked under the fact that just one country would “control” the strategic weaponry supply for the most important country in South America.
What is the importance of it all? While governments in Brazil, Chile and other countries criticize the militarization process in the continent, we have been watching Latin America become the stage of a dispute for gaining influence involving three political superpowers in the world geopolitical scenario: USA, France and Russia. As we already know, France has military bases in the French Guiana, Russia will possibly establish one in Venezuela, besides the three bases the USA is building in Colombia. This strip of land, in the North of the South American continent, will become one of the most important points in the planet, not only because it is so close to the Amazon, but also due to the tension created by one man (Chávez), the terrorist guerilla in Colombia (FARC, AUC) and the military modernization process undergone by the biggest country in South America, i.e. Brazil.
If Brazil criticizes this arms race, they should set the example, to prevent the creation of a stage for geopolitical disputes in the continent. Buying strategic weaponry from only one country justifies, at least a little, the concern of our neighbors to go through a process of military modernization.
Friday, July 10th, 2009
The approximation that the president of the United States, Barack Obama, has been attempting with Latin America indicates that the region is entering a new political moment. In the 90’s, there was the emergence of the liberal experiences driven by parties and governments of the right and center-right. In the 2000’s, it was the left that rose to power, through leaders like Lula, Michelle Bachelet, Hugo Chavez, Rafael Correa, Evo Morales, etc.
Now, a new scenario emerges. Intent on containing anti-Americanism in the region, Obama has been adopting the correct strategic positioning. Instead of confronting countries that declare themselves adversaries and “enemies” of the United States, he proposes a dialogue. This limits the rhetoric employed by leaders like Chavez, Morales and Correa. Meanwhile, the economic problems of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and others, intensify.
Another change in the North American Head of State’s foreign policy concerning Latin American regards the White House’s preferential partner. In the Bush administration it was Alvaro Uribe’s Colombia. Now, Obama is turning to Lula’s Brasil.
This new moment that the Latin American continent is experiencing can be seen in the Honduran political crisis. In the wake of Barack Obama’s condemnation of the coup against Manuel Zelaya, Hugo Chavez – the US’s biggest rival in the region – was left without rhetoric. Unlike previous instances, the Venezuelan leader’s actions were restricted to a condemnation of what occurred in Honduras.
There are clear signs that anti-Americanism in Latin America will be reduced in the upcoming years.
Another important lesson to be learned from the Honduran crisis regards the Bolivarian Revolution championed by Chavez. Despite the constitutional alterations that occurred in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, this model cannot be transposed to any situation, as evidenced by Manuel Zelaya’s failed attempt to consult the population.
Friday, July 10th, 2009
Given the diagnostic presented in Analysis 1, it is possible to delineate the following scenarios:
Scenario 1
Manuel Zelaya cannot return to the country and Honduras becomes isolated. In addition to lacking political support among Latin American governments, it will experience serious economic difficulties. For example, because of the Coup, the World Bank froze US$270 million in credit destined for the country. The Inter-American Development Bank suspended a US$200 million repass. To make matters worse, the USA – traditionally an ally to Honduras in Central America – condemned the institutional rupture through the words of its president, Barack Obama. The only positive aspect of Zelaya’s departure from power is that the provisional government will enjoy more support from the political system to govern and establish consensuses.
Scenario 2
Without support from the media and the political system, only strong external pressure exercised by the USA, OAS, UN, IADB, IBRD, etc. can make Manuel Zelaya’s return to power viable. Even if that is the case, he will have to negotiate a deal to govern. Without the support of Congress and with a fragile social base, it will be difficult for Zelaya to maintain power solely through international support.
Friday, July 10th, 2009
After many years, Latin America again experiences an institutional rupture. Such is the case in Honduras. The political crisis was generated by then President Manuel Zelaya’s decision to remove the head of the Armed Forces, Romeo Vasquez, from his position.
Zelaya made the controversial decision after Congress and the Supreme Court deemed a plebiscite that could open the door for a Constituent Assembly, illegal. According to critics, the maneuver had as its goal the approval of a reelection – prohibited by the current Magna Carta.
Vasquez was relieved of his duties for refusing to provide logistical support to Zelaya’s proposal, who was eventually deposed by Congress. Roberto Micheletti took his place as interim-President.
Though many believe that Zelaya’s ousting is due to external motivations – namely, Honduras’ participation in ALBA – the Honduran crisis is primarily a domestic affair.
Until now, Honduras’ fragile government was held by an elite took alternate turns at power. Something along the lines of a pact between the National and Liberal parties, the two main political parties in the country. Politically, both are centrists that lean to the right.
Though he is the son of a farmer and belongs to the Liberal Party, Manuel Zelaya has grown close with the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, drifting away from his traditional base. He has become closer with the unions and the indigenous movement.
Taking advantage of an average economic growth of 5.5%, Zelaya increased the minimum wage by 60% and strengthened relations with groups without political representation.
The drifting away from the traditional parties that polarized Honduran politics since 1981 and the low capability of mobilization of the groups Zelaya has approached, left him in a fragile position. To make things worse, the Armed forces turned against him.
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